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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff--Respondent,

)

vs.
DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF,

)
)

Defendant--Petitioner.

QUESTION FOR REVIEW
The defendant was charged with second degree murder, a
first degree felony.

He was tried to the court without a jury

and convicted of manslaughter, a second degree felony.
The trial court, in pronouncing its judgment of guilty
of manslaughter, made certain findings of fact, specifically,
that the defendant did not understand the risk of death or harm
to which he was apparently exposing the victim by the acts he
committed, whereupon the court then found the defendant guilty
of manslaughter, declaring—the defendant submits, in error—
that he could be guilty of manslaughter based upon an objective
standard, rather than a subjective standard.
Defendant submits, that based upon the findings of fact,
made by the trial court, the defendant should, at most, have
been convicted of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor.
Furthermore, defendant submits that the treatment the child
received upon admittance to the Dixie Medical Center was so
1

inadequate that had she been treated properly, she would not
have died.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On July L8f 1989, Case No. 880358-CA, the Court of Appeals
upheld the verdict of the trial court, sustaining the verdict
of guilty of manslaughter, a second degree felony.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals entered its decision on July 19, 1989.
Defendant submits this court has jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, Rule 4 3 (2), i.e. "When a panel of the Court
of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in
a way that is in conflict with a decision of this court;...11
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND
REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-204 Manslaughter.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the
actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or
(b) causes the death of another under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances
where the actor reasonably believes the
circumstances provide a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is
not legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (1) (b), emotional disturbance
does not include a condition resulting from mental
illness as defined in Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under
Subsection (1) (b), or the reasonable belief of the
actor under Subsection (1) (c), shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances.

2

(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
76-5-206. Negligent homicide,
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide
if the actorf acting with criminal negligence, causes
the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent
or with intent or willfully"; "knowinglyf or with
knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal
negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain
to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct
or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was originally charged with second degree
murder arising out of the death of a three and on half year
old child.
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The case was tried to the court without a jury.

The trial

court found the defendant not guilty of second degree murder,
but guilty of manslaughter, a second degree felony.
The defendant appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals where
that court affirmed the decision of the trial court and confirmed
the guilty of manslaughter verdict rendered by the trial court.
From that decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, defendant
files his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was having a relationship with the mother
of Stevie Kirkwood. (T. 380-383)
On May 7, 1989, defendant, with a companion, Mr. Kelton,
while on their way to Cedar City from La Verkin, Utah, noticed
a rattlesnake beside the road, and took it back to the Kirkwood
home where defendant was residing. (T.21)
Later in the afternoon, defendant, who had an outdoors
background, had been bitten several times as he grew up by
rattlesnakes, with no lasting effect, entertained the snake
for a couple hours, until he had it "tamed" to the point that
he was carrying the snake around his neck, petting it, kissing
its head, placing the head of the snake down his pants and
handling the snake, generally with no fear or concern for his
safety. (T. 27; T.399)
Among those watching the defendant as he demonstrated his
lack of fear of, and ability to control the rattlesnake, were
several school children returning from school, neighbors,

4

acquaintances of the defendant, Mrs. Kirkland, her young son
and, Stevie the three and a half year old victim.
Ultimately, Stevie went into the house and was playing
in the bathroom with her kitten.

The defendant took the snake

into the house to demonstrate the process of "milking a snake.11
(T. 402)
While the child played with the kitten, defendant laid
the snake across the shoulder of the child to show her how tame
and harmless it was.
Jeri Kirkland, the mother, fearful for her child, obtained
a gun, came into the house where the defendant and child were,
and threatened to kill defendant with the gun. (T. 29)
Whether startled by defendants reaction to the threat
from Jeri Kirkland or not, nevertheless, the snake struck the
shoulder of Stevie. (T. 404)
The defendant peeled the fangs from the shoulder, lacerated
the wound, and attempted to suck the venom from the child's
shoulder.

(T. 405)

The child was taken to the Dixie Medical Center, some 25
or so miles away and inadequately administered anti-venom. (T.
195; T.509)
After initial improvement, the child had a respiratory
arrest and died. (T. 108)
The defendant, who was intimate with the child's mother,
considered her children, including the victim, Stevie, with
the same love as if they were his own. (T. 39; T. 383-385; T.

5

453-455)
ARGUMENT
I-MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS FOUND BY TRIAL COURT
As the Court of Appeals noted on page 5 of its opinion,
"...The trial court f s findings, entered after a bench trial,
will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e.,
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987)."
However, the Court of Appeals, failed to follow the law
pronounced in that case.
It must be pointed out that the trial court, in a trial
to the bench fulfills two separate and distinct functions.
One, as in jury trials, dictates the law to be applied by the
finder of fact.

Two, in a trial without a jury, the trial court,

unlike in the case of a jury trial, also serves as the finder
of fact.

As a result, his decision is made up of two distinct

functions, to find the facts, and to apply the law to the facts
as they are found.
In the instant case, the court found certain facts, which
the appellate court is bound to accept, unless they are "clearly
erroneous,"

according to the Walker case, supra.

The trial court clearly made a finding that the defendant
was not aware of the risk his conduct created, when the court
stated:

6

Did the defendant know his conduct created a grave
risk of death to another? I find that he did not.
(Sentencing transcript, page 4, line 10-11)
Further, the trial court stated:
In order to find that the defendant knew that his conduct
created a grave risk of death to another, I would have
to find that he was reasonably certain that if he exposed
that snake to Stevie, that she would be bitten and die.
The evidence just doesn't support that finding.
This is a subjective analysis which I base on the
facts that I've heard in the case. Ifm convinced that
the defendant subjectively believed that he had the snake
calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not
bite.
The defendant obviously had convinced himself, in
spite of the warning that he had received to the contrary,
that the snake was not dangerous, and that there was no
grave risk of death to anyone under these circumstances.
As I've previously said, I find the defendant was
wrong on that point. There certainly was a grave risk,
and tragically he was wrong. But in view of the
requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that
the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk
of death, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that
he had that knowledge. (Emphasis added)
It is, of course true, that the court was making those
findings at a time when he was analyzing the second degree
charge, but it is extremely important to recognize that those
were "findings of facts" not "conclusions of law."

The court

was exercising its function as the trier of fact, inasmuch as
it was sitting without a jury.
It is also admitted that the court seemed to contradict
itself later in the decision when he was specifically discussing
manslaughter.

However, when the court made the contradictory

statements, it was obviously laboring under the mistaken belief
that an objective standard was the applicable standard for the
offense of manslaughter, and no doubt, was applying what the

7

court believe the so-called "reasonable man" should have known
or understood, not what the defendant understood and believed
--according to his own prior findings.
Nevertheless, the court cannot logically and reasonably
make one finding of facts for one issue, then make another
finding of facts to apply to a second issue.
The trial court made the findings quoted above, "...that
the defendant did not know that his act in placing the snake
close to Stevie would most certainly result in her death."
(Sentencing Tr. p 9)
They are logical and supportable findings, and if it were
a jury finding, would constitute an exoneration of the defendant
of both the more serious offenses of second degree murder and
of manslaughter, as will be discussed hereinafter.
While it is an unusual situation where the findings are
made by a court rather than by a jury, logic dictates that
certain principles should apply regardless of whether it is
a judge who makes the findings of fact, or a jury, and the
appropriate principle here, is that the defendant was, in effect,
found not guilty of second degree murder and of manslaughter
by the court's findings, and that it cannot thereafter, go back
and reverse that not-guilty finding and convict him of one of
those offenses.
The defendant submits, that in making the findings, as
quoted above, the trial court was then obligated to apply the
appropriate law to those findings.

8

If the court erred, in

applying the law to those findings, as defendant submits it
did, that is precisely the where the appellate court has the
duty and the ability to overturn the decision of the trial
court—not in reversing it f s findings of fact.
Defendant submits that that is the error the Court of
Appeals committed, i.e. in ignoring the findings of fact,
precisely stated by the trial court and applying law to facts
that were distinctly rejected by the trial court.
The law which should have been applied to the findings
of fact as made by the trial court is found in several cases
of this court.
First, it should be pointed out that the trial court, in
finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter specifically stated
that,

,f

I want to note at this point that the defendant is bound

by an objective standard and not a subjective one."

(Sentencing

transcript, page 10)
That, of course, is in error if the court is applying the
standard required under the cases dealing with manslaughter,
and is only correct, if dealing with negligent homicide.
Defendant cites to the court, State v. Dyer 671 P.2d 142
(Utah, 1983), State v. Boggess 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982), State
v. Bryan 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), and State v. Watts 675 P.2d
566 (Utah, 1983).
In the Dyer case, this court cited subparagraphs (3) and
(4) of § 76-2-103, supra, and then stated:
The only difference between reckless (manslaughter) and
criminally negligent conduct is that under the former,
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one perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas
under the latter, one fails to even perceive the risk.
The risk in both cases must be of such a degree that an
ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize
it. The distinction, then, is merely one of the degree
of perception of the riskT71 (Emphasis added)
The court adopted Justice Stewartfs concurring opinion
in the Boggess case, supra, and held that:
The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the
same as that for reckless manslaughter. The only
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state
of the defendant at the time the crime was committed.
In one, the actor perceives the risk but unreasonably
disregards it; in the other, he simply negligently fails
to perceive the risk.
In the Bryan case, supra, this court recently held:
Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted with
'recklessness1, must be consciously, and therefore
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of causing death.
Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction under that provision. (Emphasis
added.)
Likewise, in State v. Watts, supra, this court said that if
the "manifestations of the defendant's conduct shows that he
failed to 'perceive the risk of death...that constitutes criminal
negligence; while his conscious awareness of, but equally
conscious disregard for, the probably consequences of his
conduct...' constitutes manslaughter.
Defendant submits that while the Court of Appeals gave
lip service to the principle of the Walker case, supra, it,
in fact, devoted almost its entire opinion to discrediting the
opinion rendered by the trial judge concerning the facts, i.
e. that the defendant did not consciously appreciate the danger

10

that his actions may have caused, and attempted to justify
contrary findings of fact.
In fairness, it should be noted, that the trial judge did
essentially the same, first finding the precise facts that would
justify only a conviction for negligent homicide, then later
appearing to contradict himself.

Nevertheless, it is clear

that the trial court was amply justified in finding that the
defendant subjectively had no awareness of the danger his acts
entailed, and having so found, the trial court should not take
away with its left hand what it has given with its right hand.
Especially when the trial court was confused as to the standard
to be applied. (Sentencing transcript, p 10)
We are dealing with an area of the law where the exposure
to criminal conviction should, even must, be finely and clearly
delineated and not broadly construed.

If the court was confused

and contradictory in his opinion, it is clear that he could
not have found the higher level of culpability by proof

beyond

a reasonable doubt 1
The four cases cited above amply demonstrate that this
court has held, contrary to the trial judge's mistaken
pronouncement that the standard for manslaughter is an objective
standard, that in fact, to find the defendant guilty of
manslaughter, he must have been, "...consciously, and therefore
subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
causing death," (Bryan case, supra) and that if he did not,
the most he could be convicted of is negligent homicide—which,
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obviously is subject to an objective standard.
The Court of Appeals did not even address this issuef though
it was argued during the oral argument, spending the bulk of
it's decision justifying*, from its reading of the cold record,
a "factual finding" that would support the higher offense,
manslaughter,r ignoring the finding made by the trial court.
II-INADEQUATE TREATMENT BY THE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS
The defendant, while acknowledging that what law there
is in Utah suggests that mere negligence on the part of health
providers does not absolve the defendant of culpability, under
the facts of this case where the anti-venom administered by
the medical personnel was woefully inadequate, even by the
standards provided on the instructions with the anti-venom and
where, had the proper amount of anti-venom been administered,
it was the opinion of expert witnesses, the child might not
have died, the law in Utah should be reviewed and perhaps
revised.
Wherefore, the defendant and petitioner prays that this
court grant a writ of certiorari and accepts this case for
review.
Respectfully submitted the <^^*^day of
1989.

". MacArthur Wright
Attorney for Defendant and
petitioner,
Darrell Lawrence
Wessendorf

12

MAILING CERTIFICATE
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MacArthur Wright, Attorn

1

ST. GEORGE, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1988; 3:50 P.M.

2 I

-oOo-

THE COURT:

We're back in session.

5 I minutes to 4:00 P.M.
6

Anything you want to take up before I
announce my decision?

9
10

MR. WRIGHT:

13
14 I

I have nothing more at this time,

Your Honor.

11
12

The defendant is present with his

counsel, as is counsel for the State.

7 I
8 J

It's now 10

MR. ROWE:

Nothing, Your Honor, on behalf of the

State.
THE COURT:

All right.

This case has been described as a tragic set

15

of events, and I want to underline that.

16

tragic set of events.

17

decides, there will be great dissatisfaction.

18

I'm sure no matter what this court

Let me begin by analyzing the elements of

19

second-degree murder.

20

is defined by the following elements:

21

I view this as a

Under the law, second-degree murder

That the defendant acted under circumstances

22

evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, and he

23

engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to

24

another and thereby causes the death of another.

25

Those elements have been analyzed by our

1

Supreme Court in the Bolsinger case and an additional

2

element added.

3

The Bolsinger elements are as follows:

That the defendant engages in conduct which

4

creates a grave risk of death to anotherf and that conduct

5

results in the death of another, number one.

6 I
7

Number two —
element —

and this is the additional

that the defendant knew that his conduct or the

8 I

circumstances surrounding his conduct created a grave risk

9

of death to another.

10

And then three, that the defendant acted

11

under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to

12

human life, which the Supreme Court has said is a

13

qualitative judgment to be made by the trier of fact.

14

As I analyze these elements, there certainly

15

is no question about the defendant causing the death of

16

another.

17

And Ifll speak more on that in a few minutes.
Did he engage in conduct creating a grave

18

risk of death to another?

19

not.

Counsel has argued that he did

I find clearly that he did.

20

Even though only one or two in a thousand

21

snakebite victims die, that is clearly a grave risk of

22

death. JJndernocij^

23

exposing ^lepomilace to snakebites on the theory that one

24

or two deaths per thousand is an acceptable Hjsfe^

25

are unacceptable figures, and snakebite clearly creates a

the law sanction

Those

1

grave risk of death, even if the odds for survival from

2

that risk are better than one might enjoy from exposure to

3

some other kinds of risks,

4

The gravity of the risk in this case, of

5

course, is escalated by the size of the snake, the size

6

and age of the child, and the location on the child's body

7

which the defendant exposed to the potential bite.

8

I find that element is proven beyond a

9

reasonable doubt.

10

Did the defendant know his conduct created a

11

grave risk of death to another?
_
,

I
12

I find that he did not.
.
—»*

The definition of "knowing" as set out in our

13

code is set out in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter

14

part of that section says:

15

with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct

16

when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to

17

cause the result."

18

"A person acts knowingly or

In order to find that the defendant knew that

19

his conduct created a grave risk of death to another, I

20
21

* would have to find that he was reasonably certain that if
he exposed that snake to Stevie, that she would be bitten

*

I

5^1

—.

The evidence just doesn1t support that finding. Oc^j^X
This is a subjective anal^sjjjjLJ^
on T&A

22 |
23 J

and die.

24

the facts that I've heard in the case.

25

the defendant subjectively believed that he had the snake

I'm convinced that

1 I calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not
2

bite.

3

The defendant obviously had convinced

4

himself,

in s p i t e of the warnings t h a t he had received t o

5

t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t the snake^as^jiot^jd^ngerous y and t h a t

6

thcrre was no grave r i s k of death to anyone under these

7

circumstances.

8
9

As I've previously said, I find the defendant
was wrong on that point.

There certainly was a grave

10

risk, and tragically he was wrong.

But in view of the

11

requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that

12

the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk

13

of death, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that he

14

had that knowledge.

15

The last element of second-degree murder is

L6

the defendant's act evidenced a depraved indifference to

L7

human life.

L8
L9
JO

I believe that the defendant loved Stevie
Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members
*of her family; that he had no desire or intent to harm

tl

h e r . His conduct does not evidence depraved indifference,

\2

given these facts.

3

In Bolsinger, our Supreme Court defines

4

depraved indifference as follows:

"To constitute depraved

5

indifference, the act must be one which has been rather

1

w"« II uriilr n l IM>,| .1 in11ii'i

jmmun ±aw t o i n v o l v e something more

s e r i o u s than r e c k l e s s n e s s

i ~* t h e r e must be a Knowing ana
' the

- harmful effee
:

so heinous
I \i id

b* equivalent

IL must uc characterized „x unmitigated wickedness,
extreme inhumanity, or acts exhibiting a high degree of
in m J 1 1 1

•' T h e .i- < ^
1

Wessendorf ' ' M s case do

• not sink

li j
12

r

i will now analyze manslaughter! a
1 esser-included offense I i i I :1 lis c a s e ,

l'l

T h e e l e m e n t s o£ m a n s l a u g h t e r a r e that tin

14

defendant recklessly caused the death of another.

Under

IS

71

is

16

defined as f o l l o w s :

reckleSSlv"

1

.•

• '

Oil* , M M I

I I in1 i l e l e i n l i i i i l

1 i ..iwan 1 ol

ii

18

s u b s t a n t i a l and u n j u s t i f i a b l e risk w i t h respect to h i s

19

c o n d u c t o r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g liJs coin!

20

Two, that he consciously disregards that

21

risk.

22

•

23

25

t

nit; txsk i s s u c h - t h a t xua u i s i e g a r d

c o n s t i t u t e s a gross d e v i a t i o n from t h e standard of c a r e

ur, as viewer! 11 oiii I |n« »,)' I'-ndaii* "s

1

standpoint.

2

There again is no question that the defendant

3

caused the death of another.

4

all agree that the victim died of a rattlesnake bite.

5

In this case, the experts

Although much has been made of the medical

6

treatment provided the victim, all the experts agree that

7

nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's

8

death.

9

the snake close enough to Stevie to inflict the bite, that

It was clearly the act of the defendant in placing

10

caused her death or at least was a concurrent cause of

11

death.

12

Was the defendant's act reckless?

I find

13

that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt

14

that there was a substantial and unjustifiable and even

15

grave risk of death to Stevie in the defendant's act of

16

placing an unrestrained rattlesnake on the shoulder of

17

Stevie.

18

You will recall in the defendant's

19

testimony —

20

indicated that he was holding the snake four or five

21

inches below its head because he did not want it to feel

22

restrained.

23

brief testimony this afternoon —

he

I further find that the evidence clearly

24

shows that the defendant was aware of that risk.

As

25

opposed to knowing that he was going to cause a death, he
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1

There's no question in my mind at all that

2 I the defendant was aware beyond a reasonable doubt of the
3

risks that Stevie was put to resulting from the snakebit<

4

even though he did not know that his act in placing the

5

snake close to Stevie would most certainly result in her

6

death.

7

Ifm also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

8

that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial

9 J and unjustifiable risk, in that the snake would bite. He
He f s been bitten,

10

was aware that rattlesnakes do bite.

11

himself, several times.

12

exhibited coiling when animals such as dogs approached.

13

He was aware that Stevie had a kitten in her arms when h<

14

exposed her to the snake.

15

were already upset by the presence of the snake and migh

16

do something that would startle the snake and cause it t

17

strike or bite.

18

He was aware that the snake

He was aware that others aroui

I find the defendant consciously disregarde

19

these risks as evidenced by his decision to place the

20

snake in close proximity to Stevie in spite of the risks

21

of which he was aware.

22

It is uncontroverted in this case that the

23

ordinary person in the defendants standpoint —

in oth

24

words, trying to decide "Do I expose this child to this

25

snake or not?" —

would consider the defendant's act of

placing the snake on Hie child's shoulder —
i n|" win,!I happened —

wiixuu is i
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Because of my findings stated above,,,

ill

not explore the elements ~* negligent homicide stated in
the cases counsel :* •
manslaughter and negligent homicide j s tl le perception of

1

the risk involved in the defendant's activity.

2

I have found that the defendant was aware of

3

the risks and perceived those risks, and therefore the

4

case clearly can't come under negligent homicide.

5

I find the defendant not guilty of

6

second-degree murder as charged in the Information.

7

find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense

8

of manslaughter, a second-degree felony.

9
10

Anything else we need to take up at this
point?

11
12

MR. ROWE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Wright, what is the defendant's

position on a presentence report?

15

MR. WRIGHT:

16

THE COURT:

THE COURT:
explain briefly.

22

report.

23

however.

25

Your Honor, we would concur in

requesting a presentence report, Your Honor.

21

24

Certainly.

MR. WRIGHT:

18

20

Could I have a moment, Your Honor?

(Discussion off the record.)

17

19

I believe it should be

referred for a presentence report.

13
14

I

All right.

Mr. Wessendorf, just let me

You have the right to have a presentence

That cannot be done without your concurrence,
That report process takes about 30 days.
During that time, the probation department

will be contacting you and asking you some questions and

some

i n f o r m a t i o i j which

pi epa i t* I lie

.report.
uv

be prepared?
Ml*
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possibility
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II:
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A d u l t p r o b a t i o i i and P a r o l e f o r
presentence

c a n l)e p r e p a r e d

today

i M li n f
* .

!

would

«

appropriate.
MR. WRIGHT:

on April

Yes f

J It'll, I 9 0 0 „

sir.

Tha 1 ^ 1 - fine, Your Honor.

And

Mr

'

« Wessendorf, just to make sure you're

2

clear, are you willing to waive your right to be sentenced

3 I

until that date?

4

MR. WESSENDORF:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

Yes, sir.

All right.

this case?
MR. ROWE:

It's been set at $50,000.

8

no motion to reduce that.

9

MR. WRIGHT:

L0

THE COURT:

LI

There's been

I think it's 100,000, Your Honor.
All right.

Any motion with regard to bail?

12

MR. ROWE:

13

THE COURT:

14

What is the bail set in

I don't have any.
Bail will remain as set, then, to

guarantee the defendant's appearance.

15

We'll see you back here on the 11th,

16

Mr. Wessendorf.

17

obligation to be back here on April 11th at 9:30 in the

18

morning for sentencing, without notice.

19

appear, a warrant will be issued for your arrest.

20

If you are released on bail, it's your

Any questions about that?

21

MR. WESSENDORF:

22

THE COURT:

23

If you don't

No, sir.

Anything else we need to take up at

this time?

24

MR. ROWE:

25

MR. WRIGHT:

Nothing, Your Honor.
Not at this time, Your Honor.
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf appeals from his conviction,
after a bench trial, of manslaughter, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989).
Wessendorf appeals, claiming his acts constituted, at most,
negligent homicide, not manslaughter, and that the death of
Stevie Kirkwood was caused by the intervening treatment or
negligence of medical personnel.
On May 7, 1987, Willis Kelton picked up Wessendorf at the
home of Jeri Ann and Marshall Kirkwood in LaVerkin, Utah, where
Wessendorf rented an upstairs room. As Kelton and Wessendorf
were traveling toward Cedar City, they saw a great basin
rattlesnake by the si de of tl le road. Kelton stopped the car
and Wessendorf got out and used a tire iron to put the snake
into a bag. Kelton and Wessendorf returned to the Kirkwood
home where Wessendorf tied the bag containing the snake to a
tree. Wessendorf and Kelton then left: to go to Cedar City,,

II

Kelton and Wessendorf returned to LaVerkin that same
afternoon, after consuming some tequila. When Wessendorf
arrived back at the Kirkwood home, he released the forty-two
inch long snake. The snake tried to crawl off a few times and
coiled up every time dogs in the yard approached. As a result,
Wessendorf, for the most part, sat with the snake coiled up
underneath his leg.
Ms. Kirkwood returned home with her two-year-old daughter,
Stevie, about 3:00 p.m. and was confronted by Wessendorf
holding the snake around his neck and allowing it to move
around his body. Wessendorf teased Ms. Kirkwood with the snake
in an attempt to get her to touch it. Wessendorf persisted in
this conduct even though Ms. Kirkwood was obviously frightened
by the snake. Wessendorf also kissed the snake's head, put it
down his pants, and approached several friends and neighbors
with the snake. Ms. Kirkwood told her six-year-old son, who
had just returned from school, to go to a neighbor's house for
safety. She told Stevie to go to her bedroom and play, where
she would be out of Wessendorf's sight. Ms. Kirkwood walked
across the street to the Church residence. Wessendorf followed
with the snake around his neck. Mr. Church warned Wessendorf
that the snake was dangerous and could bite and kill someone.
Wessendorf told Mr. Church not to worry about it.
Later that day, Wessendorf took the snake into the
Kirkwood home over the objections of Ms. Kirkwood. Wessendorf
walked into the house with the snake draped across his
shoulders and proceeded to the bathroom where Stevie was
playing with a kitten. While Stevie was stroking the kitten
with one hand, Wessendorf took her left hand and stroked the
snake with it. Wessendorf then stepped behind Stevie and
draped the snake's tail over her left shoulder.
Simultaneously, Wessendorf held the snake four or five inches
below its head because he did not want it to feel restrained.
Stevie screamed and tried to get away. Wessendorf attempted to
take the kitten away from Stevie so that she could put both of
her hands on the snake. Meanwhile, Ms. Kirkwood got a gun from
her bedroom and started toward the bathroom. Upon seeing the
snake draped across Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ordered Wessendorf to
remove the snake immediately. Wessendorf ignored her repeated
requests. Finally, Wessendorf turned to look at Ms. Kirkwood
and felt the snake move in his hand. He looked back at Stevie
and saw the snake attached to her neck. Realizing that Stevie
had been bitten, Wessendorf pulled the snake off her and asked
Kelton to take the snake outside. Ms. Kirkwood dropped the gun
and attempted to get her daughter. Wessendorf closed the
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bathroom door, lacerated Stevie's shoulder and attempted to
suck the snake venom from the wound. Ms. Kirkwood called the
police and went outside and shot the snake. Wessendorf came
out of the house carrying Stevie and headed toward his truck to
get his snake bite kit. Ms. Kirkwood took Stevie from
Wessendorf and placed her in the car. A scuffle developed
between Wessendorf and Kelton about whether Kelton or
Wessendorf should accompany Ms. Kirkwood to the hospital.
Kelton eventually went with Ms. Kirkwood to the hospital,
Upon arriving in the hospital emergency room, Stevie was
treated by four physicians who administered antivenin through
an intravenous line. Stevie showed signs of improvement, but
suddenly suffered respiratory failure and cardiac arrest.
Wessendorf was charged with second degree murder, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c)
(Supp. 1989). At trial, Dr. Edwin Sweeney, the Utah State
Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy on Stevie, stated
that the cause of death was venomous snakebite. Dr. Richard C.
Dart, an expert in the treatment of venomous snakebites,
testified that Stevie died from the snakebite and that merii - 1
personnel did not cause Stevie's death.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court analyzed
the elements of second degree murder and manslaughter and
applied them to the facts of the case. After finding that
Wessendorf did not have the requisite mens rea for second
degree murder, the court examined whether Wessendorf acted with
recklessness, the mens rea for manslaughter, It found that
Wessendorf was aware that placing the snake on Stevie's
shoulder exposed her to a substantial and unjustifiable risk n)
death. The court then listed numerous factors which
demonstrated Wessendorf• s awareness of the risk, including
Wessendorf's caution in capturing the snake with a tire iron,
placement of the snake in a bag, Mr. Church's warnings about
the danger of the snake, Ms. Kirkwood*s apparent fear of the
snake, and Wessendorf's observation that the snake coiled in
the presence of other animals. In view of these and other
facts, the court found that Wessendorf knew, but consciously
disregarded the risks in placing the snake in close proximity
to Stevie. Accordingly, the court concluded that Wessendorf
possessed the requisite mens rea for manslaughter,
recklessness, and was guilty of manslaughter. Finally, the
court stated that a]1 the experts agreed that nothing the
doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's death and that
Wessendorf's act of placing the snake close enough to StevLn 1

880Jbb -CA

3

inflict the bite was the cause or the concurrent cause of her
death.
I.

MANSLAUGHTER v. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

Wessendorffs first assertion of error is that he was
erroneously convicted of manslaughter and should have been
acquitted or convicted of negligent homicide, Wessendorf
claims that he did not act recklessly, as required for
manslaughter, but, at most, acted with criminal negligence, the
standard for negligent homicide.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989),
[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another . . . ." In
comparison, H[c]riminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence causes the death
of another.H Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1978). Thus, the mens
rea for manslaughter is recklessness, while the mens rea for
negligent homicide is criminal negligence.
M

A person acts recklessly when:
he is aware of but consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances surrounding his conduct
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that
its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise under
all the circumstances as viewed from the
actorfs standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1978).
with criminal negligence:

However, a person acts

when he ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1978).
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Wessendorf argues that in determining that he acted
recklessly, the trial court erred in applying an objective
standard of what a "reasonable man" would perceive. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that the mens rea of recklessness for
manslaughter requires that defendant be aware of but consciously
disregard a substantial risk the result would occur. State v.
Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979); see also State v. Dver,
671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). In contrast, the mens rea of
criminal negligence constituting negligent homicide is that
defendant was unaware of but ought to have been aware of a
substantial risk the result would occur. Howard, 597 P.2d at
881. Although the Howard court stated that the distinction
between the mens rea for each crime is one of intent, id., the
court in Dyer further clarified that the distinction involves
the degree of perception of risk. Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148.
Further, the court stated that degrees of perception cannot be
clearly delineated, but operate on a continuum. 1£. Both
crimes, therefore, necessitate evaluation of the defendant's
state of mind. In addition, in Dyer, the court recognized that
the statutory language includes application of an objective
standard, i.e., that H[t]he risk in both cases must be of such
a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to
recognize it." Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148. Therefore, according to
case law and the statute, to constitute manslaughter, the risk
must be of such a nature that an ordinary person wl 10 was aware
of the risk would not disregard it.
With these legal principles i n mi i id, w e examine t h e trial
c o u r t ' s factual findings to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r they a r e c l e a r l y
e r r o n e o u s and w h e t h e r t h e findings support t h e trial court's
legal c o n c l u s i o n that W e s s e n d o r f committed m a n s l a u g h t e r , T h e
trial c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , entered after a b e n c h t r i a l , w i l l n o t
be o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s they a r e c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , i.e., against
the clear w e i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e , o r if t h e a p p e l l a t e court
o t h e r w i s e reaches a d e f i n i t e and firm c o n v i c t i o n that a m i s t a k e
has b e e n m a d e . S t a t e v . W a l k e r , 7 4 3 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1 9 8 7 ) , In a s s e s s i n g t h e trial court's legal c o n c l u s i o n s , w e
apply a c o r r e c t i o n of error standard. S t a t e v . J o h n s o n , 7 7 !
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In the instant case, the trial court found that Wessendorf
was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of death to Stevie in his act of placing an unrestrained
rattlesnake on Stevie's shoulder. The court enumerated several
facts which established Wessendorf's awareness of the risk.
Wessendorf originally picked up the snake with a tire iron,
transported the snake in a bag and, was warned by Mr. Church
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and others that the snake was dangerous and might bite or kill
someone. In addition, others, including Ms. Kirkwood, were
apprehensive and exhibited fear of the snake. Further,
Wessendorf kept a snakebite kit in his truck, indicating a
clear awareness of the risk of a snakebite. After the snake
bit Stevie, Wessendorf slammed the bathroom door and tried to
remove the venom, again demonstrating an awareness of the
danger of a snakebite. Wessendorf also argued with Ms.
Kirkwood because he wanted to continue to remove the venom as
they drove to the hospital. Moreover, rattlesnakes had bitten
Wessendorf several times before and thus he knew that
rattlesnakes bite. He was also aware that the snake coiled
when dogs approached and that Stevie was holding a kitten at
the time he draped the snake around her. Finally, Wessendorf
was aware that the snake's presence upset others and that
someone might startle the snake and cause it to strike or
bite. In view of these facts, the court found that Wessendorf
was aware of substantial risks of injury or death and
consciously disregarded these risks in placing the snake in
close proximity to Stevie.
These findings are amply supported by the testimony at
trial, and we defer to the trial court's advantageous position
in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the
testimony. State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98, 99 (Utah 1988). In
light of these facts, the trial court did not err in finding
Wessendorf acted recklessly, as defined in section
76-2-103(4). In addition, the trial court did not err in
referring to an objective as well as a subjective standard, as
both are involved in applying the manslaughter statute.
II.

INTERVENING MEDICAL TREATMENT

Wessendorf also contends the medical treatment Stevie
received was an intervening cause of death and should
constitute a defense to his manslaughter conviction. In
homicide cases, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim's death resulted proximately
from the defendant's act or omission. State v. Bassett, 27
Utah 2d 272, 495 P.2d 318, 319 (1972). In addition,
intervening medical error is not a defense where the defendant
has inflicted a mortal wound upon another. State v. Velarde,
734 P.2d 449, 456 (Utah 1986).
Wessendorf claims the instant case is distinguishable from
Velarde in that he did not inflict a mortal wound upon Stevie.
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Wessendorf asserts that because the weight of the evidence
establishes that rattlesnakes rarely cause death, he did not
inflict a mortal wound upon her.
However, the trial court found that Mall the experts agree
that nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's
death" and that Wessendorfs act of placing the snake close
enough to Stevie to inflict the bite was the cause or the
concurrent cause of her death. At trial, Utah State Medical
Examiner, Dr. Sweeney, testified that the cause of Stevie1s
death was the venomous snakebite. In addition, Wessendorf's
expert witness, Dr. Dart, testified that Stevie died from the
snakebite and medical personnel did not do anything to cause
Stevie's death. Because the trial court's finding is supported
by the evidence, it is not clearly erroneous. The State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the snakebite, not the medical
treatment, was the proximate cause of Stevie's death.
Wessendorf, therefore, is precluded from claiming intervening
medical error as a defense.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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